Group signature (GS) schemes guarantee anonymity of the actual signer among group members. Previous GS schemes assume that randomness in signing is never exposed. However, in the real world, full randomness exposure can be caused by implementation problems (e.g., using a bad random number generator). In this paper, we study (im)possibility of achieving anonymity against full randomness exposure. First, we formulate a new security model for GS schemes capturing full randomness exposure. Next, we clarify that it is impossible to achieve full-anonymity against full randomness exposure without any secure component (e.g., a tamper-proof module or a trusted outside storage). Finally, we show a possibility result that selfless-anonymity can be achieved against full randomness exposure. While selfless-anonymity is weaker than full-anonymity, it is strong enough in practice. Our transformation is quite simple; and thus, previous GS schemes used in real-world systems can be easily replaced by a slight modification to strengthen the security.
Introduction
In our daily life, we use various web-services, and these services often require authentication to verify if a user is qualified. Anonymity is an important security notion in authentication systems when sensitive information is handled. For example, let us consider an electronic first-price sealed-bid auction. All bidders submit sealed bids of their own valuations, and the highest bidder wins and pays the price they submitted. In this case, it is required that no bidder links a valuation with any other participant. Thus, we need to verify that a valuation is certainly submitted by one of bidders (i.e., authenticity), but it must be hidden who submits the valuation (i.e., anonymity). Group signature (GS) [1] is a special kind of digital signatures to provide both authenticity and anonymity. In GS, a group manager issues signing keys of a group of signers, and a signer generates a group signature with his/her signing key. Any entity except the group manager (or an opener) cannot distinguish the signer from other group members. Hence, a verifier can verify the validity of the group signature without knowing the actual signer. If we apply GS to the auction, bidders generate group signatures of their valuations, and only the auctioneer can verify signatures and know who is the highest bidder though bidders Manuscript received December 15, 2016 . Manuscript revised April 20, 2017 . Manuscript publicized July 21, 2017 . † The authors are with Ibaraki University, Hitachi-shi, 316-8511 Japan.
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and third parties cannot know it even with information of signatures and their signing keys. The first unified formal security model of GS is defined by Bellare et al. [2] . Though this model is for the static group case (i.e., a group of signers is fixed before signing.), it is extended to the dynamic group case [3] (i.e., a new signer can join the group after signing.). In these security models, anonymity is defined as full-anonymity (FAnon). Intuitively, FAnon guarantees that no adversary can distinguish two signatures generated by distinct signers even if all signing keys of the group are given. Thus, FAnon means that even the actual signer cannot decide if a signature is generated by his/her own. On the other hand, there is a weaker anonymity definition, called selfless-anonymity (SLAnon) [4] . SLAnon is the same as the FAnon except signing keys of two signers for the challenge signature are not given to the adversary. Thus, SLAnon means that the actual signer can decide if a signature is generated by his/her own, but other signers (and third parties) cannot. Though SLAnon is weaker than FAnon, it seems strong enough for most of applications in practice.
Motivating Problem
Bellare et al. [2] , [3] also propose generic constructions of static or dynamic GS. In the past decade, various GS schemes are introduced based on these generic constructions, e.g, the static group setting [5] - [7] and the dynamic group setting [8] - [13] . Some GS schemes (or its variants supporting user revocation) satisfy SLAnon [14] - [18] . These GS schemes are provably secure in formal security models [2] - [4] . However, all of these security models suppose that randomness in generating signatures is never exposed. In the real world, randomness will be fully exposed in various situations. For example, if a bad random number generator (RNG) is implemented in a system using GS, then outputs of the RNG are easily predicted by adversaries; and thus, randomness is fully exposed. (e.g., the incident of Debian's OpenSSL package [19] ) Also, even if the RNG is not weak, inappropriate implementations like reuse of nonce or randomness cause full randomness exposure. If there is a problem on the randomness generation in a system, randomness in the system setup and key generation procedure can be protected because it is generated once in the setup timing, usually, outside of the system under the off-line manner. Conversely, exposure of randomness in the signature generation procedure is not prevented because it must be generCopyright c 2017 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers ated in the system under the on-line manner. Therefore, it is desirable that GS schemes are still secure if randomness in the signature generation is fully exposed. However, since previous security models do not capture randomness exposure, it is unclear if previous GS schemes are secure against randomness exposure. Though leakage-resilient cryptography (e.g., leakage-resilient signature [20] ) or hedged cryptography (e.g., hedged encryption [21] ) seems a solution for this problem, these approaches are not applicable if randomness is fully exposed because these approaches assume that some uncertainty of randomness is left for adversaries.
Our Contribution
This paper clarifies the influence of full randomness exposure for GS schemes, and how to make GS schemes secure against randomness exposure.
First, we introduce a new security model of GS, which captures randomness exposure. Especially, randomness exposure affects anonymity. We call FAnon and SLAnon against full randomness exposure FAnon-RE and SLAnon-RE, respectively. In our model, the adversary can access an additional oracle (Rev) to provide randomness in generating the challenge signature as well as oracles in the previous security model [3] . In this paper, though we consider the dynamic group case, our modelling method is trivially applied to the static group case.
Next, we show that it is impossible to achieve FAnon-RE without any secure component. The secure component means that the adversary cannot obtain any information from it even with all oracles, and can be realized by a tamper-proof module or a trusted outside storage. In other words, if the adversary can obtain all secret information of the actual signer, the adversary can distinguish the actual signer from others by using randomness for any GS schemes. Specifically, we show a general attack procedure.
Finally, we propose a generic transformations of GS to satisfy SLAnon-RE. Our transformation is quite simple: applying a pseudo-random function (PRF) to generate new randomness with a secret salt. The salt is stored in a part of the signing key. Similar techniques are used to resist secret exposure attacks in authenticated key exchange schemes like [22] . Thanks to its simplicity, we can replace GS schemes implemented in systems by a slight modification in order to provide randomness exposure. We prove that a transformed GS scheme satisfies SLAnon-RE if the original GS scheme satisfies SLAnon.
Furthermore, we show that FAnon-RE is also achievable with a physical assumption. Specifically, by relying on a secure component, we can avoid our impossibility and construct a generic transformation of FAnon-RE GS schemes. In this case, the salt of the PRF is stored in the secure component. Though such an assumption is not natural, it may be useful in applications that some secure component (e.g., a smart card, a private cloud storage) can be used.
Security Model
In this section, we introduce a new security model for dynamic GS, which captures security against full randomness exposure in the signature generation. The main difference from the previous model is to add a new oracle in order to expose randomness. We note that our security model can be easily modified to the static group setting.
Throughout this paper we use the following notations. If ALG is an algorithm, then by y ← ALG(x; r) we denote that y is output by ALG on input x and randomness r (if ALG is deterministic, r is empty). If A is an adversary, then by y ← A(x : Oracle) we denote that y is output by A on input x and A can pose queries to Oracle.
Syntax of Dynamic Group Signatures
A dynamic group signature scheme GS consists of eight algorithms (GKg, UKg, GSig, GVf, Open, Judge, Join, Iss).
• GKg is a group key generation algorithm which takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a group public key gpk, an issuer key ik and an opener key ok. The trusted third party runs the GKg, and the isuuer key ik is provided to the issuer, and the opener key ok is provided to the opener. The group public key gpk is published.
• UKg is a user key generation algorithm for a user i, which takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a user public key upk [ • GSig is a signature generation algorithm which takes as input the group public key gpk, a message m and the group signing key gsk [i] , and outputs a signature σ on the message m.
• GVf is a signature verification algorithm which takes as input the group public key gpk, a message m and a signature σ, and outputs 1 if σ is valid for the massage m, otherwise outputs 0.
Fig. 1 Oracles
• Open is an opening algorithm which takes as input the group public key gpk, the opener key ok, a registration table reg, a message m and a signature σ, and outputs i and τ where τ is a proof that σ is generated by the user i.
• Judge is a judging algorithm which takes as input the group public key gpk, a user i, a user public key upk[i], a message m, a signature σ and a proof τ, and outputs 1 if τ generated by Open is valid, otherwise outputs 0.
Security Definition

Oracles
First, we define the adversarial capacity as the access to oracles. In the previous model [3] , ten oracles are defined: add user AddU, corrupt user CrptU, send to issuer SndToI, send to user SndToU, reveal user secret keys USK, read registration In addition to these oracles, we newly add oracle Rev which returns randomness r used to produce σ. Let HU be a set of honest users, CU be a set of corrupted users, Gset be a set of pair (m, σ) of message/signature produced by Ch b and σset be a set of a tuple (i, m, σ, r) of user/message/signature/randomness produced by Sig and Ch b . Figure 1 shows definitions of oracles. We must carefully define Rev. If inputs of Rev contain a user i as well as a message and a signature, then the adversary can check if the user i actually generates the signature. Thus, anonymity is trivially broken by using Rev. We formulate Rev to avoid such trivial attacks.
Correctness
Correctness means that a signature generated by an honest group member should be valid, Open should correctly identify the signer from the signature, and the proof generated by Open should be accepted by Judge.
Definition 2.1 (Correctness): We difine the experiment
Exp corr GS,A (κ) for a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A and a security parameter κ as follows:
The advantage of A is defined as:
. We say that the dynamic group signature scheme GS is correct if Adv corr GS,A (κ) = 0 for any PPT adversary A.
Anonymity
Anonymity means that the corrupted issuer and users should be unable to distinguish the actual signer from others with a signature. Especially, if even the actual signer cannot decide if the signature is generated by him/herself, then we call fullanonymity, FAnon. If the actual signer can decide if the signature is generated by him/herself, then we call selflessanonymity, SLAnon.
Definition 2.2 (Anonymity): We define the experiment
Exp anon−b
GS,A (κ) for a PPT adversary A and a security parameter κ as follows:
We say that the dynamic group signature scheme GS is FAnon-RE if Adv anon GS,A (κ) is negligible. We say that the dynamic group signature scheme GS is SLAnon-RE if A poses neither USK(i 0 ) nor USK(i 1 ), and Adv anon GS,A (κ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
Remark 2.1: When Rev oracle is removed from
Exp anon−b GS,A (κ), the definition means FAnon or SLAnon in [3] , [4] (i.e., without considering randomness exposure).
Traceability
Traceability means that the corrupted opener and users should be unable to generate a valid signature such that the actual signer cannot be opened, and should be unable to generate a valid signature such that the proof generated by the honest opener is rejected by Judge. 
. We say that the dynamic group signature scheme GS is traceable against randomness exposure if Adv trace GS,A (κ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
Non-Frameability
Non-frameability means that the corrupted issuer and opener should be unable to generate a valid signature and a valid proof accepted by Judge for an honest user.
Definition 2.4 (Non-frameability):
We define the experiment Exp n f GS,A (κ) for a PPT adversary A and a security parameter κ as follows:
We say that the dynamic group signature scheme is non-frameable against randomness exposure if A poses neither USK(i) nor GSig(i, m), and Adv n f GS,A (κ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
Impossibility of Full-Anonymity against Full Randomness Exposure
In this section, we show that FAnon-RE is not achievable if users do not have any secure component (SC). The notion of SC means that the adversary cannot obtain the content of the SC even with any oracle queries like USK. In the real world, the SC is realized by a local tamper-proof module or a trusted outside storage. In other words, if a user does not have any SC, then the adversary can obtain all secret information of the user by posing USK because secret information must be stored in usk [i] or gsk [i] in the security model. Pose Ch b (i 0 , i 1 , m) , and obtain σ. From Theorem 3.1, we cannot construct a GS scheme satisfying FAnon-RE in the standard setting (i.e., without any SC). On the other hand, the given attack is not applicable to the case of SLAnon-RE because A cannot proceed
Step.3 due to the restriction of the definition of SLAnon-RE.
Generic Transformation for Selfless-Anonymity against Full Randomness Exposure
In this section, we introduce a generic transformation of GS to guarantee anonymity against full randomness exposure. As we prove in Sect. 3, FAnon-RE is not achievable. However, we can achieve SLAnon-RE without any SC. Though anonymity is weaker than FAnon-RE, it is strong enough in practice to use in most of applications because only the actual signer may distinguish the his/her signature from other signatures.
Building Block
Let κ be a security parameter, which is chosen according to required key length. Let F = {F κ : Dom κ × S alt κ → Rng κ } κ be a function family with a family of domains {Dom κ } κ , a family of salt spaces {S alt κ } κ and a family of ranges {Rng κ } κ . 
Transformation π S LAnon for SLAnon-RE
We give the generic transformation π S LAnon which provides SLAnon-RE to a SLAnon GS scheme. For a GS scheme GS = (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, GSig, GVf, Open, Judge), we denote the transformed GS scheme by π S LAnon (GS) = (GKg , UKg , Join , Iss , GSig , GVf , Open , Judge ). We denote randomness used in GSig by (r 1 , . . . , r n ). π S LAnon uses PRFs (F 1 , . . . , F n ) , where Dom and Rng of F j depend on the space of r j . The protocol of π S LAnon is as follows: 
Security
We show security statements of the generic transformation π S LAnon . Correctness is obvious from the protocol. Here, we give sketches of proofs. First, we show the intuition of the proof of Theorem 4.2. The difference between GS and π S LAnon (GS) is how to generate a signature. In GS randomness is directly used, and in π S LAnon (GS) outputs of PRFs are used instead of randomness. From pseudo-randomness of PRFs, the adversary cannot distinguish outputs of PRFs from random values because the adversary cannot pose USK(i 0 ) and USK(i 1 ), and cannot obtain salts (k 1 , . . . , k n ) of i 0 and i 1 . Thus, outputs of PRFs in π S LAnon (GS) can be replaced with random values generated from random functions. In this situation, Rev oracle does not help the adversary because outputs of Rev are independent to random values used in π S LAnon (GS). Therefore, SLAnon of GS implies SLAnon-RE of π S LAnon (GS).
Next, we show the intuition of the proof of Theorem 4.3. In the experiment, an adversary does not have the access to Sig and Ch b . Thus, Rev oracle never returns other than ⊥, and is not any help of the adversary. Therefore, traceability of GS without Rev oracle naturally implies traceability of π S LAnon (GS).
Finally, we show the intuition of the proof of Theorem 4.4. In the experiment, an adversary cannot pose USK and CrptU for the target user. Hence, the adversary cannot distinguish outputs of PRFs from random values because the adversary cannot obtain salts (k 1 , . . . , k n ) of the target user. Outputs of PRFs in π S LAnon (GS) can be replaced with random values generated from random functions. A subtle point is that the adversary may pose Sig query for the target user before outputting the forgery. Thus, the simulator guesses the target user in advance. It is possible because the maximum number of group members is polynomial. Therefore, non-frameability of GS without Rev oracle implies non-frameability of π S LAnon (GS).
Proof of Theorem 4.2
We change the interface of oracle queries in the experiment of Exp anon−b π S LAnon (GS),A (κ). These instances are gradually changed over hybrid experiments, depending on specific sub-cases. In the last hybrid experiment, SLAnon-RE of π S LAnon (GS) is guaranteed from SLAnon of GS. We denote these hybrid experiments by H 0 , . . . , H n , and the advantage of the adversary A when participating in experiment H i by Adv(A, H i ).
Hybrid experiment H 0 :
This experiment denotes 
Hybrid experiment H
Instead of computing r j = F j (r j , k j ), it is changed as obtainingr j from a random function RF.
We construct a distinguisher D to distinguishr j from r j = F j (r j , k j ) by assuming an adversary A distinguish H j from H j−1 . D performs as follows:
Setup. Generate (gpk , ik, ok) ← GKg (1 κ ), and set CU ← ∅, HU ← ∅, Gset ← ∅ and σset ← ∅. Give gpk and ik to A as input.
Simulation.
• Op(m, σ): If (m, σ) ∈ Gset, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return Open (gpk , ok, reg, m, σ).
• • WReg(i, ρ):
• USK(i):
• CrptU(i, upk):
• 
Choose r 1 , . . . , r n from Dom of PRFs andr 1 , . . . ,r j−1 from Rng of PRFs, pose r j to the PRF oracle (i.e., F j or RF), and obtain r j . Generate σ ← GSig(gpk, m, σ, (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ). Return σ.
• r 1 , k 1 ) , . . . , F n (r n , k n )). Thus, outputs of Rev oracle (r 1 , . . . , r n ) are independent from σ. We construct an adversary B for GS by assuming an adversary A for H n . B performs as follows:
Setup. Receive (gpk, ik) as the challenge, choose PRFs (F 1 , . . . , F n ), and set gpk = (gpk, F 1 , . . . , F n ) and σset ← ∅. Give gpk and ik to A as input.
• Op(m, σ): Pose (m, σ) to Op, and return the output of Op.
• SndToU(i, M in ): Pose (i, M in ) to SndToU, and return the output of SndToU.
• WReg(i, ρ): Pose (i, ρ) to WReg.
• CrptU(i, upk): Pose (i, upk) to CrptU, and return the output of CrptU.
• Sig(i, m): Pose (i, m) to Sig, obtain σ, and choose (r 1 , . . . , r n ). Set σset ← σset ∪ (i, m, σ, (r 1 , . . . , r n )). Return σ.
•
, obtain σ, and choose (r 1 , . . . , r n ).
Set σset ← σset ∪ ( * , m, σ, (r 1 , . . . , r n )). Return σ.
• Rev(m, σ): If ( * , m, σ, r) σset, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return r.
Analysis. For A, the simulation by B is same as the experiment H n . Thus, if the advantage of B is negligible, then Adv(A, H n ) is negligible.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
The proof is trivial. In Exp trace π S LAnon (GS),A (κ), A does not have Sig and Ch b oracles. Thus, there is no record in σset, and Rev oracle always returns ⊥. It means that Rev oracle is not any help of A. Therefore, even if GS is traceable without Rev oracle, π S LAnon (GS) is also traceable.
Proof of Theorem 4.4
We change the interface of oracle queries in the experiment of Exp n f π S LAnon (GS),A (κ). These instances are gradually changed over hybrid experiments, depending on specific sub-cases. In the last hybrid experiment, non-frameability of π S LAnon (GS) is guaranteed from non-frameability of GS without Rev oracle. We denote these hybrid experiments by H 0 , . . . , H n+1 , and the advantage of the adversary A when participating in experiment H i by Adv(A, H i ).
Hybrid experiment H 0 :
This experiment denotes Hybrid experiment H j for 2 ≤ j ≤ n + 1: The computation of GSig (gpk, gsk[i] , m; (r 1 , . . . , r n ) ) in Sig oracle is changed. Instead of computing r j−1 = F j−1 (r j−1 , k j−1 ), it is changed as obtainingr j−1 from a random function RF.
We construct a distinguisher D to distinguishr j−1 from r j−1 = F j−1 (r j−1 , k j−1 ) by assuming an adversary A distinguish H j from H j−1 . D performs as follows:
, and set CU ← ∅ and HU ← ∅, Gset ← ∅ and σset ← ∅. Give (gpk , ik, ok) to A as input.
Simulation.
• WReg(i, ρ):
• In H n+1 , all computations of GSig in Sig oracle use random (r 1 . . . ,r n ) instead of (F 1 (r 1 , k 1 ) , . . . , F n (r n , k n )). Thus, outputs of Rev oracle (r 1 , . . . , r n ) are independent from σ.
We construct an adversary B for GS by assuming an adversary A for H n+1 . B performs as follows:
Setup. Receive (gpk, ik, ok) as the challenge, choose PRFs (F 1 , . . . , F n ), and set gpk = (gpk, F 1 , . . . , F n ) and σset ← ∅. Give (gpk , ik, ok) to A as input.
Analysis. For A, the simulation by B is same as the experiment H n+1 . Thus, if the advantage of B is negligible, then Adv(A, H n+1 ) is negligible.
Achieving Full-Anonymity against Full Randomness Exposure with Physical Assumption
We show another way to avoid our impossibility in Sect. 3 by relying on a physical assumption (i.e., using the SC). We give the generic transformation π FAnon which provides FAnon-RE to a FAnon GS scheme. For a GS scheme GS = (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, GSig, GVf, Open, Judge), we denote the transformed GS scheme by π FAnon (GS) = (GKg , UKg , Join , Iss , GSig , GVf , Open , Judge ). We denote randomness used in GSig by (r 1 , . . . , r n ) (i.e., GSig internally generates n random values). First, we show the intuition of the proof of Theorem 5.2. The difference between GS and π FAnon (GS) is how to generate a signature. In GS randomness is directly used, and in π FAnon (GS) outputs of PRFs are used instead of randomness. From pseudo-randomness of PRFs, the adversary cannot distinguish outputs of PRFs from random values because the adversary cannot obtain salts (k 1 , . . . , k n ) from S C even when USK is posed. Thus, outputs of PRFs in π FAnon (GS) can be replaced with random values generated from random functions. In this situation, Rev oracle does not help the adversary because outputs of Rev are independent to random values used in π FAnon (GS). Therefore, FAnon of GS implies FAnon-RE of π FAnon (GS).
Next, we show the intuition of the proof of Theorem 5.3. In the experiment, an adversary does not have the access to Sig and Ch b . Thus, Rev oracle never returns other than ⊥, and is not any help of the adversary. Therefore, traceability of GS without Rev oracle naturally implies traceability of π FAnon (GS).
Finally, we show the intuition of the proof of Theorem 5.4. Like the situation of the proof of Theorem 5.2, the adversary cannot distinguish outputs of PRFs from random values because the adversary cannot obtain salts (k 1 , . . . , k n ) from S C even when USK is posed. Outputs of PRFs in π FAnon (GS) can be replaced with random values generated from random functions. Therefore, non-frameability of GS without Rev oracle implies non-frameability of π FAnon (GS).
∅ and HU ← ∅, Gset ← ∅ and σset ← ∅. Give (gpk , ik, ok) to A as input.
Simulation.
• • WReg(i, ρ): Set reg[i] ← ρ.
USK(i): Return (gsk[i] , usk[i]).
• CrptU(i, , k j+1 ) , . . . , F n (r n , k n ))). Set σset ← σset∪ (i, m, σ, (r 1 , . . . , r n )). Return σ.
• Rev(m, r 1 , k 1 ) , . . . , F n (r n , k n )). Thus, outputs of Rev oracle (r 1 , . . . , r n ) are independent from σ. We construct an adversary B for GS by assuming an adversary A for H n . B performs as follows:
Simulation.
• • CrptU(i, upk): Pose (i, upk) to CrptU, and return the output of CrptU.
• Rev(m, σ): If (i, m, σ, r) σset, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return r.
Output. If A outputs b , then B outputs b .
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